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Abstract
The theory of deliberative democracy places public deliberations at the heart of democracy. In order to
participate in democratic deliberations, citizens need certain skills, attitudes, and values. Within the
field of education for deliberative democracy, it is assumed that these are learned through participation
in democratic deliberation. Thus, one way to educate future citizens for deliberative democracy is by
constructing democratic deliberations in the classroom. In this article, four strategically chosen examples of discussions taking place inside classrooms are analyzed, in order to flesh out the abstract criteria
of democratic deliberations and to create an empirically based typology of classroom discussions. In this
article I also aspire to contribute to classroom practices by pointing out how teachers can steer classroom
discussions toward democratic deliberation: They can use questions that open up space for disagreement, while at the same time present opportunities to reach collective conclusions.

Submit a response to this article
Submit online at democracyeducationjournal.org/home

Read responses to this article online
http://democracyeducationjournal.org/home/vol24/iss1/5

T

he idea of deliberative democracy has been widely
discussed in political theory over the last two
decades. It has also made an impression in the field of
democratic education. Many who are interested in democratic
education have started to ask how the skills and values assumed
necessary for deliberative democratic participation can be taught
and learned.
In a review of the field of education for deliberative democracy, Samuelsson and Bøyum (2015) argue that it is characterised
by both agreement and disagreement. There is an overarching
agreement that students and future citizens learn the skills and
values necessary for deliberative democratic participation by
partaking in deliberative discussions. Yet the field is also marked
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by significant disagreements and differences in focus. The most
important one is between studies viewing deliberation primarily
as a political concept and studies viewing it primarily as a
pedagogical concept. The first body of work starts from a theoretical conception of deliberative democracy and reasons from
there toward the skills and values future citizens should develop.
The second position starts with a pedagogical conception of
deliberation, that is, deliberation as a classroom practice, and
moves from there toward the skills and values that participation
in it is expected to generate. This difference in focus and starting
point only becomes a problem, however, when the pedagogical
conception is not connected to the political idea of deliberative
democracy. Thus, when it is argued that the pedagogical method
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of deliberation fosters, for example, general social and emotional
skills, it is an open question how and whether these skills are
related to deliberative democracy. The result is a field in which
empirical articles investigate something different than the
theoretical field is arguing for and, thus, that the two bodies of
studies tend to talk past each other.
The first aim of this article is to bring the more theoretical,
political ideal of deliberative democracy closer to the pedagogical
ideas of deliberation as a classroom practice. To do so, it is necessary to flesh out the abstract criteria of democratic deliberation
with a concrete pedagogical content, without removing oneself too
far from the political conception of deliberation. Using four
strategically chosen examples of classroom discussions, I develop
an empirically based typology (Kluge, 2000) that seeks to make
salient the character of democratic deliberation taking place inside
classrooms as well as to highlight the difference between democratic deliberations and discussions that appear to be deliberative
in the relevant sense but that lack one or more crucial features. In
this way, I strive to bridge the gap between the abstract criteria of
democratic deliberations and the discussions taking place in
classrooms. A second aim of the article is to contribute to classroom practices by pointing out how teachers can steer classroom
discussions in the direction of democratic deliberation with the
use of certain types of questions.
I begin by giving an account of the theoretical foundation of
deliberative democracy, of democratic deliberations, and of the
pedagogical idea of education for deliberative democracy. I then
describe the empirical study on which the article is based, before
presenting the typology of discussions found within the material.
In this section, I also conduct a step-by-step analysis of representative examples of each type in order to show what a democratic
deliberation might look like inside a classroom as well as to
distinguish it from other closely related types of discussions.
Finally, based upon the typology, I discuss possible implications for
classroom practices in education for deliberative democracy.

Deliberative Democracy
Theories of deliberative democracy hold that the essence of
democratic politics does not lie in voting and representation but in
the common deliberation that underlies collective decision making
(Chappell, 2012). At the core of these theories is the reason-giving
requirement: Citizens and their representatives should justify to
each other in a process of public deliberation the laws they impose
on one another (Thompson, 2008). Whereas voting-centred views
see democracy as an arena where fixed preferences and interests
compete, deliberative democracy emphasises the communicative
formation of will and opinion that precedes voting. In this view,
democracy gets its legitimacy not through majority rule per se but
through the process of giving defensible reasons, explanations, and
accounts for public decisions (Held, 2006). In short, a legitimate
political order is one that can be justified to all those living under
its law (Chambers, 2003).
A number of different theorists have contributed to the
development of the theory of deliberative democracy. It has mainly
developed in two branches with slightly different focuses. The
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“European view,” led by Habermas, has focused on developing a
macrolevel theory of deliberative democracy, while the “North
American view,” influenced by Rawls’s political liberalism and
primarily represented by Gutmann, Fishkin, and Cohen, has
concentrated on exploring real-life examples of actual public
deliberation. Despite differences in attention, however, there are
some aspects of deliberative democracy that most scholars of
deliberative democracy agree on. Two of them are highly relevant
to this article: the essential features of a good democratic deliberation and the purpose of such deliberation.
According to Habermas, a good deliberative process is based
upon “the ideal speech situation,” a communicative situation
where everybody can contribute, where they have an equal voice,
and where they can speak freely and honestly without internal or
external deception or constraint (Chappell, 2012). According to
Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 2004), it is a reason-giving
process in which participants use arguments accessible to all
citizens and appeal to principles that all reasonable citizens could
accept. Fishkin (2009, p. 34) sees deliberation as a process
where arguments offered by one perspective are answered by
considerations from other perspectives and where the arguments
offered are considered on their merits regardless of which
participant offers them. Thus, it is possible to discern a common
core in these ideals of democratic deliberation. It is a discussion
in which different points of view are presented and underpinned
with reasons, and participants listen respectfully to each other
and reflect on other participants’ claims and arguments.
There is also a rough agreement in the field about the
purpose of a democratic deliberation. It is directed toward some
form of collective-will formation. This is the practical, political
aspect of deliberation: The participants are in some way trying to
reach an agreement on how to act (see, for example, Habermas,
1998). We may thus distinguish between deliberation in a narrow,
political sense and deliberation in a wide, not necessarily political
sense. This means that a discussion can be deliberative (in the
wide sense) without being connected to an idea of democracy.
For example, in what may be called an explorative deliberation,
participants may discuss a certain claim or concept and use
arguments and reasons to inquire into it, but without striving to
reach a collective decision to act upon. In order for a discussion
to be deliberative in the sense pertinent to deliberative democracy, it also has to involve a striving for a collective-will formation, that is, some agreement about what to do.
Despite the overarching agreement in the field, there are also
disagreements. For example, what is to count as a deliberative
reason? According to Gutmann and Thompson (1996), a reason
has to be guided by reciprocity in order to qualify as deliberative in
a democratic sense. The principle of reciprocity asks citizens to use
reasons other reasonable and similarly motivated citizens could
accept, even if they have different worldviews. On the other hand,
theorists like Young (2000) have argued that many formulations
of deliberative democracy are too narrow. She argued that by using
strict criteria for what counts as deliberative, one runs the risk of
excluding from democratic participation certain types of reasons,
perspectives, forms of conversations, and in the end, citizens.
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Therefore, reasonableness should not be restricted to specific types
of reasons but rather be defined as a willingness to listen to others
and to maintain an open attitude to those who try to explain to you
why you are wrong (p. 24). As should be clear, this discussion is not
limited to questions about reasons alone but is also related to
broader questions of democratic legitimacy, inclusion, and
exclusion.
Similar disagreements can be found concerning the aim of
democratic deliberation. Some have argued that deliberation
should aim for a deep kind of consensus, in which citizens ideally
agree on the course of action as well as on the reasons for it (Chappell, 2012), while others, given the challenges of a modern, pluralistic society, have argued for a relaxed notion of consensus, in which
participants agree on the course of action but not necessarily on the
reasons for it. Important influences for the latter position are
Rawls’s (1987) notion of an “overlapping consensus,” Sunstein’s
(1995) notion of “incomplete theorized agreements,” and Gaus and
Vallier’s (2009) idea of “convergence.”

Education for Deliberative Democracy
Deliberative democracy has been criticized for being unrealistic:
People are neither willing nor capable of participating in democratic deliberations (Englund, 2007). They are, so this criticism
goes, driven by self-interest and are not willing to make decisions
based on the idea of the common good and/or are too irrational
and emotional to be capable of listening to reasons and arguments.
Hence, they stick to the beliefs they already hold rather than being
open to letting them be transformed in deliberation with others.
However, even if one assumes what is already doubtful, that
this is true of the current situation, this criticism is based on a static
view of people as unable to learn. If future citizens are taught to
participate in deliberative democracy, the likelihood that they will
be capable of doing so will increase. Furthermore, if citizens were
capable of participating in democratic deliberations, the possibility
of successfully implementing more deliberative practices in society
would also increase, as would the opportunities for citizens to
co-construct democratic deliberations on their own. Therefore, an
education for deliberative democracy seeks to educate future
citizens to participate in and to co-construct democratic deliberations and is, thus, first and foremost interested in teaching them
how to state claims, give reasons, listen to and reflect on others’
arguments, and strive toward finding a solution in collaboration
with other participants.
Within the field of education for deliberative democracy
there is a general agreement that future citizens learn the skills
and values necessary for deliberative democratic participation
primarily by partaking in deliberative situations, and not, for
instance, by reading about deliberative democracy (Samuelsson &
Bøyum, 2015). But what does this mean more concretely? The
common core of democratic deliberation described so far seems
too abstract to be applied directly in classrooms. Perhaps the
clearest contemporary translation of deliberative democracy into
a pedagogical conception is that by Englund (2006). A deliberative educative situation, according to Englund, is one in which
(a) different views are confronted with one another and
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arguments for them are articulated; (b) there is tolerance and
respect for the concrete other, and participants listen to each
other’s arguments; and (c) there are elements of collective-will
formation, a desire to reach consensus or a temporary agreement.
Two additional criteria are also formulated, stating (d) that
traditions are allowed to be questioned and (e) that deliberative
communication should eventually take place without teacher
control. However, according to Englund, the first three criteria
represent the inner core of deliberative communication. We may
summarize these as three requirements: the reason-giving
requirement, the reflective requirement, and the consensus
requirement. The assumption is that by participating in classroom
discussions following these criteria, students will have the
opportunity to practice making arguments, giving reasons,
listening to others, and so on, while at the same time being part of
a collective-will formation process. By partaking in deliberative
educative situations, students will, it is hoped, gradually become
more and more competent at democratic deliberation.
However, as shown above, there are disagreements about the
precise definition of deliberative democratic criteria. Furthermore,
if one assumes, as this paper does, that future citizens learn
deliberative skills and values by partaking in deliberative situations,
specific features of those situations become important because
different interpretations have different educational implications.
Will the students be encouraged to strive toward a deep or a relaxed
notion of consensus? Will they learn that a deliberative reason has
to be accompanied by reciprocity, or should reasonableness rather
be understood as merely a willingness to listen? In one sense, this
article sides with Young (2000) in leaving the concept of reason
open, since it does not take a specific stand on what is to count as a
reason. By leaving the reason-giving requirement, along with the
other two requirements, slightly open, I argue that it is possible to
bridge the gap between theories of deliberative democracy on one
side and empirical research conducted in classrooms on the other
without losing the essence of deliberative democracy in the process.
However, as I shall return to, this openness does not stop the
students themselves from adopting stricter criteria for deliberation
in particular contexts.
Yet even if we are now somewhat closer to fleshing out the
abstract criteria of democratic deliberation, we still need to get a
more concrete idea of what a classroom discussion that satisfies the
three requirements actually might look like. In order to do this, it is
important to distinguish democratic deliberations from discussions that are similar but lack one or more characteristic features.
Hence, the aim now is to bring the theory of deliberative democracy and the ideas from deliberation as a classroom practice closer
together, by analyzing examples of classroom discussions and by
developing a practically useful typology.

Empirical Study
The data for the empirical study that this article is based on was
collected during the spring and autumn of 2014. The method of
collection was qualitative, since the main interest was an in-depth
investigation of classroom discussions. Three different schools were
visited, all located on the west coast of Norway, in or just outside
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one of the bigger cities in the region. I accompanied one teacher at
each school for approximately two weeks, observed their classroom practices, conducted formal interviews with them, and was
involved in informal conversations. The data contains samples
from different grades (five, six, seven, eight, nine, and upper
secondary) as well as different subjects (English, math, Norwegian,
social science, and psychology). The profiles of the schools varied,
with two of them being more ethnically diverse than the third. One
school had a religious foundation, while the other two did not. The
teachers were all interested in democracy as an educational aim, as
well as in classroom discussion as a pedagogical practice. However,
they were unfamiliar with the concept of deliberative democracy
prior to participating in this study. Furthermore, even though the
Norwegian national curriculum does include democratic competence as an explicit aim, the concept of deliberative democracy is
absent. Nevertheless, as will be shown, it is fully possible that the
discussions in the observed classrooms have democratic deliberative characteristics, even if the teachers were unfamiliar with the
concept at the time.
The loosely structured observation guide that directed my
attention during data collection was based mainly on Englund’s
three core criteria. Thus, I intentionally looked for discussions
satisfying the reason-giving requirement, the reflective requirement, and the consensus requirement. During data analysis, a
number of discussions seemed at first glance to be examples of
democratic deliberations. However, upon closer analysis, significant differences between them appeared, allowing for the construction of a typology of classroom discussions relevant to
education for deliberative democracy. In the following, I shall
present this typology, illustrating each type with a representative
example. As will be made clear, only the fourth and last is a case of
democratic deliberation in the sense relevant to theories of
deliberative democracy (which does not mean that the other three
cannot be useful for teaching skills and values essential for
deliberative democratic participation). Illustrating the first type is
an example from a discussion about beauty, while the second type
is exemplified by a mathematical discussion. The third type is
illustrated with a discussion focusing on human rights, while the
fourth and final type is exemplified by a discussion about how a
class is going to work with a topic.

A Typology of Classroom Discussions
1. The explorative discussion.

The first type is a discussion with pervasive disagreement but with
little striving toward consensus. To exemplify this, let’s look at a
discussion taking place in an English class in upper secondary
school. Ten students and one teacher were present during the
discussion, which focused on the concept of beauty. The debated
questions fluctuated from “Why is beauty important?” to “Is
modern art beautiful?” At first glance, this discussion seemed to be
an example of a democratic deliberation, since the students were
presenting different viewpoints; they seemed to listen to each
other; and they seemed willing to think about each other’s statements and posed replies to them. In the following short extract, the
teacher and two students discussed whether people in the Middle
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Ages could appreciate beauty in their everyday lives. The teacher
argued that they did appreciate beauty, while the students argued
the contrary.
Teacher: That doesn’t mean their whole universe was deprived of
beauty.
Peter: No, but he [Rembrandt] painted city citizens who were more
like merchants and people that at least had housing, but I
mean, throughout history most of the population have not
been that well off.
Teacher: But do you think they were completely deprived of
moments where [they asked,] “What are the possibilities
of life?”
Peter: I wouldn’t think so, but I don’t think . . .
Tobias: Yeah, but we’re not that . . .
Peter: [But I don’t think they] woke up and stopped and felt like,
“Oh, wonder what’s going on. What am I doing here?” I don’t
think many people woke up thinking like that in the morning. I think most of them just went straight to . . .
Teacher: You guys, honestly, every day I practically wake up and
it’s, I mean, [laughs] “What am I doing here?”
Several students: [laugh]
Teacher: “What are the possibilities of this day?”
Tobias: Yeah, like Peter said, it wasn’t any better; it was worse back
then. In the big cities, if you go back a couple of hundred
years, then you didn’t have sewers, so what people would do?
They would dump the sewage out their windows, meaning
you literally had sewage running through the streets. That’s
not beautiful. You would wake up and: “Oh, there is sewage
in the middle of the road.”
This type of discussion fulfills both the reason-giving and the
reflective requirements. In the example above, different claims
were put forward, such as “That doesn’t mean their whole universe
was deprived of beauty” and “But I don’t think they woke up and
stopped and felt like, ‘Oh, wonder what’s going on. What am I
doing here?’” The different claims were underpinned with arguments and reasons, for instance, “It was worse back then. In the big
cities, if you go back a couple of hundred years . . . sewage [was]
running through the streets . . . That’s not beautiful.” Furthermore,
they listened to each other and responded to each other’s statements: “But do you think they were completely deprived of
moments where” and “Yeah, like Peter said.” This shows the
presence of the reason-giving and the reflective requirements.
However, the consensus condition is not fulfilled. There were
instances when they were responding to each other, but overall the
discussion was more an exploration of differences than a construction of a common understanding and a striving for consensus. This
is not irrelevant for democratic deliberation. Indeed, Parker (2006)
sees it as a vital precursor to a deliberative process. It is not in itself
deliberative in the sense characteristic of deliberative democracy,
however, since it is not channeled toward a resolution that can be
made a basis for a collective act. Therefore, this type has the
characteristics of an explorative discussion rather than a democratic deliberation.
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2. The problem-solving discussion.

The second type is a discussion with a clear striving for consensus but
with little real disagreement. The representative example is from a
mathematical discussion where 25 fifth-grade students were
organized in groups of four trying to find the solution to 344 divided
by 4. At first glance, this discussion seemed to be an example of
democratic deliberation, because the students were discussing with
each other, they listened to each other, and they seemed to collaborate. Furthermore, this discussion satisfied the condition lacking in
the previous example: the consensus requirement. Each group had to
come to an agreement about the answer, and they were also explicitly
encouraged to discuss how to arrive at the answer (e.g., should they
start by dividing 300 by 3 or by dividing 44 by something), and so
they had to agree upon the calculation as well.
Markus: So, do we know the answer?
Charlotte: What is 300 divided by 4? What is 100 divided by 4?
Oh [sounds disappointed].
Erik: 20, 20 times 4 is 100.
Markus: No, 100 divided by 4 is 25.
Charlotte: 25 . . . [counting out loud by herself]
Erik: It’s 20!
Markus: It’s 25.
Erik: 20, 40, 60, 80, okay, fine.
Markus: 25 times . . .
Erik: Okay, 25. I said, fine.
Charlotte: But I have 20 . . .
Markus: Yes, do you understand?
Charlotte: . . . More, 100 divided by 4 is 25, so 100 . . . 25 times 3 is 75,
then [sounds happy].
Markus: Yes, the answer is 70, ehm.
Charlotte: 75 and then add 11, 86.
Markus: Okay.
Charlotte: But that can’t be right.
Markus: Why not?
Charlotte: Oh [sounds happy], I just counted wrong, funny.
Markus: Yes, very [pretends to be laughing].
In this example, the consensus requirement is satisfied. They
arrived at a collective answer for the group, and they agreed upon
the calculation. However, this agreement was not reached by a
deliberative reason-giving process. They disagreed about some
calculations (“20, 20 times 4 is 100;” “No, 100 divided by 4 is 25”)
and about the answer (“But that can’t be right”; “Why not?”).
However, the discussion included few instances of genuine
disagreement. They disagreed, but ultimately one of them turned
out to be right, and the others turned out to be wrong. In this
example, there was a right answer limiting the disagreement. They
could have disagreed about the best way to conduct the calculation,
as encouraged by the teacher, which could have resulted in a
discussion with a less obvious correct answer, but this group ended
up only explaining the calculation to those not understanding it
yet. Therefore, this example does not include the reason-giving
requirement and the reflective requirement, essential for a democratic deliberation.
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Let us pause to compare the first two types. The explorative
discussion fulfills the reason-giving and the reflective requirements
but not the consensus requirement. Conversely, the problem-solving
discussion fulfills the consensus requirement but not the reason-
giving and the reflective requirements. Put sharply, the first is too
open to count as democratic deliberation, and the second is too
closed.1 Naturally, since the intention behind a typology is to enable
us to see recurring patterns in a chaotic world, it has to be simplified
somewhat. In reality, therefore, classroom discussions will be placed
along a continuum from open to closed, with the two types looked at
so far being located at opposite poles.
Note also that even if neither of the first two discussion types is
deliberative in the sense pertinent to deliberative democracy, they
might very well be educationally beneficial. For example, in an
explorative discussion, the students can practice making statements, using arguments, and reflecting upon other’s statements. In
a problem-solving discussion, they can practice making decisions
together using dialogue. This might be beneficial for the development of the various skills, attitudes, and values that are necessary to
participate in democratic deliberation.

3. The predetermined discussion.

The third type is also a discussion reaching a conclusion, while
showing few instances of disagreement. Thus, it has similarities
with the problem-solving discussion, but the starting point as well
as the topic of the discussion is vastly different. Fifteen students in
ninth grade, one teacher, and one teacher assistant, were discussing
different topics related to human rights, such as the treatment of
women, the death penalty, and euthanasia, over the course of one
hour and a half. The teacher initiated the classroom discussion by
presenting the content of three newspaper articles, but the discussion was not limited to those stories. The teacher explained Sharia
law to the students. She was interested in their thoughts about it
and used the following story to get them involved in the topic.
Teacher: Has anybody heard of the two girls in India who were
hanged? First they were raped, then murdered, and then
hanged.
Christian: I saw a picture.
Teacher: The two girls were casteless; do you know what that
means?
Class: No.
Teacher: In India, they have a caste system, which is a way to divide
society into different classes, like in England where you have
upper class, middle class, and working class. You can’t move
from one class to another, not really, anyway, so you are stuck
in the one you were born into. In India, you can be casteless,
and these two girls were casteless. Two of the persons
involved in this crime were police. This was not the first time
something like this happened in India in recent years. Do you
remember the girl on the bus who wasn’t allowed off when
1 This has, of course, partly to do with the subject matter, mathematics,
but note that in other cases, perhaps more so in higher education, a
discussion about mathematics could certainly satisfy the reason-giving
requirement.
feature article

5

she wanted to and, instead, was brought farther along just to
get raped by a group of men?
Class is silent.
Teacher: In India, it has become an attitude that girls are fair game.
What do you think about this?
Class is silent.
Teacher [with a little more urgency in her voice]: You agree that
rape is a bad thing?
Adrian: I think we all agree that rape is a bad thing.
At first glance, the topic seems ripe for democratic deliberation. How should women be treated in modern society? How
should the raping of women be dealt with? What legal system
should be the foundation for a nation? The ensuing discussion,
however, lived up neither to the expectations of the teacher nor to
those of the democratic theorist. A democratic deliberation
includes the consensus condition, but the problem in this type of
discussion is that consensus is already there from the start, and not
something to strive for: “I think we all agree that rape is a bad
thing,” as Adrian said. The case of the Indian girls is both shocking
and challenging; it might incite students to political action, but it
does not generate a genuine deliberation. The dialogue is not one
where different views are confronted with each other in order to
collectively find the best argument. Rather, the only argument is:
Rape is a horrible thing—there are no competing viewpoints.
Surprisingly, therefore, this example has similar characteristics to
the problem-solving discussion: The conclusion was preordained,
and there was no real discussion. The statement put forward by the
teacher—“You agree that rape is a bad thing?”—was intended to
get the discussion going, but it was obvious that it was not really up
for discussion. Thus, this example also includes few instances of the
reason-giving requirement and the reflective requirement.
As in the two previous examples, there are aspects relevant to
future democratic participation that students could learn from
taking part in this discussion. For example, the students could gain
insight into existing injustices and acquire knowledge about
human rights, and perhaps they could be stimulated to engage
politically with the treated issue. Yet the topic of this article is
whether they participated in democratic deliberations in order to
practice giving reasons, listening to and reflecting upon other
points of view, and at the same time striving to reach a collective
conclusion, and in this case they did not.

4. Democratic deliberation.

Right after the attempted discussion in the former section, the
teacher asked the students how they would like to continue
working with the topic. This question instantly turned the classroom into a forum for democratic deliberation.
Teacher: How would you like to continue working with this topic?
Because I think it is that interesting that we should continue
with it. How would you like to approach it? I can see that not
everybody has participated equally, and some of you haven’t
participated at all.
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Christian: Two teams and two sides in a debate, where one side is
for and the other is against.
Teacher: A formal debate, a debate society, okay. That could be a
good thing to have on your CV as well. For example, in the
USA that is a pretty big deal.
Adrian: In the USA, math teams are also a big thing, but we don’t
have to do those just because of that.
Teacher: But if we have two teams debating, do you have to believe
the side you are on, or can you just pretend? Can you go into
that role just for the sake of the debate?
Adrian: We have to be assigned the different positions.
Christian: If it is going to be a good discussion, it has to be
something you stand for.
Adrian: You can argue a case even if you don’t personally believe it
or agree with their arguments. You can always have pros and
cons, understand them, and use them in order to disprove
the other side. For example, if you are going to discuss rape,
one side can say, “The way she dressed was the reason,” while
the other side could answer, “That shouldn’t matter—you are
not supposed to be raped anyway,” et cetera. In that way, you
can use the arguments to disprove the other side.
Christian: I think everybody has similar opinions in here anyway.
Adrian: It could be a good exercise, to participate in a debate even
if you’re just assigned a position, to argue in favor of something even if you don’t personally agree with that point of
view.
Teacher: A defense lawyer, for example, he is supposed to do
everything in his power to win, use evidence, find loopholes,
et cetera, in order to get his client free, because that is his job.
Do you have to go into a debate with emotions, or can you
keep them out of it and be strictly analytical?
Adrian: Everybody has a price.
Teacher: But I’m thinking that maybe not everybody is equally
comfortable participating in a debate. Some of you are shy,
some of you will shut down, and some of you are disinterested. [She turns toward a group of girls sitting in the front
who have been quiet the whole time.] What do you think?
Sara: I don’t know; it’s difficult to say what you think, to express
your opinion.
Teacher: Would it be easier to write it down?
Sara: Yes, that would be better.
Adrian: I would rather have the debate.
Teacher: In a debate, it is very important that everybody feels
comfortable in order for them to participate. Take you
[addresses Adrian], for example—not to point any fingers,
but you are pretty straightforward with your opinions, and
that is your right, but that can make other people insecure,
shut down, and shy away from expressing their opinion.
Andrea: A debate is fine as long as the topic isn’t controversial.
Teacher: So, as long as the topic isn’t too controversial, it would be
fine? So, what kind of topic would you like?
Adrian: Pensions, minimum wages.
Teacher: Remember [referring to a point made earlier], not every
senior citizen has an easy ride just because they get a pension
from the state. If we are going to discuss something like
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pensions, you have to have the whole picture, and I don’t
think we have that, so that will be too difficult a topic.
Teacher assistant: What about school? You can discuss how long
pupils should have to be at school, how much homework they
should have, et cetera.
Class: Yes!
In this example, three different smaller discussions were
taking place: how to continue working with the topic; whether
students should be assigned to sides randomly, or whether they
need to believe what they are arguing for; and what the topic of the
debate should be. All of them fulfil the three requirements for
democratic deliberation.
Let us start by looking at the reason-giving requirement. In the
discussion about how to work with the topic, two different points of
views were presented, one in favor of a classroom debate and
another in favor of writing down ideas individually. Both positions
were underpinned with reasons, such as “That a formal debate is a
pretty big deal in the United States” and “It could be a good
exercise, to participate in a debate” on one side, and “Not everybody is equally comfortable participating in debates” and “It’s
difficult to say what you think” on the other. In the discussion of
whether they should be assigned to sides randomly in the debate or
should choose the side they support, different points of views were
also presented, as well as different reasons for those positions: “If it
is going to be a good discussion, it has to be something you stand
for” and “You can argue a case even if you don’t personally believe it
or agree with their arguments.” In the discussion concerning the
topic of the debate, different suggestions, such as pensions and
minimum wages, were put forth. An argument was presented
against both of them: “If we are going to discuss something like
pensions, you have to have the whole picture, and I don’t think we
have that.” This shows the presence of a reason-giving process.
The reflective requirement is also fulfilled. The students
displayed the willingness to listen to and reflect upon each other’s
arguments and reasons. They were also willing to revise their
positions based upon reasons: “A debate is fine as long as the topic
isn’t too controversial.” Furthermore, new suggestions were also
presented based upon skepticism to the original suggestions:
“What about school? You can discuss how long pupils should have
to be in school, how much homework they should have, et cetera.”
Finally, the striving for consensus is displayed explicitly when
Andrea tried to formulate a compromise that all parties could live
with—“A debate is fine as long as the topic isn’t too controversial”—
and when the whole class unanimously agreed upon the topic for
that debate. Thus, all three requirements are present and satisfied.
This is not to take a stand on the actual quality of the deliberation in
this example, but it is nevertheless an example of a democratic
deliberation taking place in a classroom.2
This example, besides being an example of a democratic
deliberation, also shows the advantage of siding with Young’s
(2000) strategy of leaving the specific content of “reason” open. By
using less strict criteria, this class was presented with the
2 For a more thorough discussion of the difference between quality of
and criteria for democratic deliberation, see Thompson (2008).
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opportunity to democratically deliberate about the criteria for a
classroom debate, such as what role emotions should have, how to
get everyone to participate, and whether the topic should be
controversial or not. By relaxing the criteria for acceptable reasons
on the theoretical level, the teacher opened up for the students
themselves to discuss and negotiate the character and structure of
deliberation on the practical level. Furthermore, the questions they
raised were important for theories of deliberative democracy as
well as for deliberative classroom practices.
In the field of deliberative democracy, the role of emotions is a
highly debated topic. Leading theorists like Habermas and Gutmann are frequently being challenged and criticized for not placing
enough emphasis on emotions. One such critical voice has been
that of Young (2000), who has stressed that emotions should not be
regarded as a flaw in people’s reasonableness but instead as a tool
of reasonable persuasion and judgment. The discussion about
emotions has also made an impression in the field of education for
deliberative democracy, where critics of the Habermasian formulation have used ideas from Mouffe and radical democracy to
incorporate emotions into the formulation of deliberative democracy (Samuelsson & Bøyum, 2015).
The class also discussed whether the topic of the debate should
be controversial or not. This is an important question, not least to
this paper. Hess (2009), a recognized name in the field of democratic education, has been one in favor of controversial topics. She
has argued, with the use of empirical studies, that students increase
their political tolerance and gain a better understanding of difficult
political questions by taking part in controversial discussions.
These results are highly interesting, and they are of importance to
anyone involved in education for democracy. However, the concern
of this paper is the development of the core skills of deliberative
democracy, which is not what Hess has focused on. Deliberative
skills are assumed learned through practice in democratic deliberation, and in my material, as shown in examples three and four, the
topic of conversation was not the decisive factor in whether a
deliberative pattern of conversation was established or not.
Furthermore, in the framework of education for deliberative
democracy, there might even be pedagogical reasons for postponing the use of controversial topics. A case can be made that highly
controversial topics are more difficult to handle than less controversial ones. For example, with highly controversial topics, students
might be very emotionally attached to one specific position (again,
the question of emotions) and might be mainly interested in getting
their points across. These aspects, arguably more present in
controversial discussions, could present challenges for creating the
desired communicative pattern of reason giving, reflection, and
collective-will formation. If the discussion instead concentrated on
questions less controversial and emotionally charged, a deliberative
communicative pattern might be easier to establish, and then, once
the students gradually became better at democratic deliberation,
more difficult questions could be introduced. The point is that if
students are to be educated for deliberative democracy by practicing at democratic deliberation, the primary task has to be to
establish a communicative pattern of democratic deliberation—
the topic of that discussion is of secondary interest.
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The main aim of the developed typology is to aid in distinguishing democratic deliberation from other closely related types
of discussions taking place in classrooms. It is worth noting,
however, that there are other typologies of classroom discussions
aimed at democratic education. Parker (2006), for example,
distinguishes between seminars and deliberations. Seminars are
used to develop and explore meanings while deliberations are used
for practicing decision making. However, my claim is that a
discussion has to include both aspects to qualify as a democratic
deliberation. Furthermore, his typology does not provide us with a
nuanced enough picture to help distinguish democratic deliberations from other closely related types of discussions. I argue that
the typology presented in this paper does that to a greater extent.

Practical Implications: Turning Classroom Discussions
into Democratic Deliberations
The examples analyzed in the previous section represent different
types of discussions. At first glance, a number of the discussions
found in the material appeared to be examples of democratic
deliberation. However, upon closer examination, these could be
placed along a continuum from open (disagreement) to closed
(consensus). On one side are discussions with pervasive disagreement but few instances of striving toward consensus (the explorative type), and on the other side are discussions with a clear
notion of consensus but few instances of genuine disagreement
(the problem-solving type and the predetermined type). These
discussions do not satisfy the three requirements for democratic
deliberations. Yet located in between these two poles are discussions that do satisfy them: democratic deliberations.
The different types of discussions do not just have different
characteristics but are also structured around different types of
questions. The explorative discussion, on one hand, is structured
around an open question, such as “Did they appreciate beauty in
the Middle Ages?” It has many open parameters, allowing the
students to genuinely disagree and to present different viewpoints
and perspectives. At the same time, it has several subjective,
diffuse, and abstract parameters, making it difficult to strive for
consensus. For example, what does it mean to appreciate beauty,
and is it possible to know if people in the Middle Ages appreciated
beauty or not? The problem-solving discussion and the predetermined discussion, on the other hand, are structured around closed
questions. The mathematical question “What is 344 divided by 4?”
is directed toward a conclusion: finding the answer to the mathematical problem. However, this question has a correct answer,
which makes it difficult to disagree. The discussion concerning
human rights has a predetermined conclusion, namely, that rape is
bad. This point of view is not up for discussion, and the students
have few opportunities to disagree. A closed question directs the
discussion toward a conclusion, an essential aspect of a democratic
deliberation, but since that conclusion is predetermined, it makes
it difficult to disagree. The democratic deliberation is placed in
between these outer positions. It is structured around a question
open enough to allow for genuine disagreement but at the same
time closed enough to clearly direct the discussion toward a
conclusion.
democracy & education, vol 24, n-o 1

The clearest example of the importance of the question asked is
when the ninth-grade class moved from a predetermined discussion
about human rights to a democratic deliberation about how to work
with a topic. The two discussions took place in the same classroom,
in the same class, involving the same teacher and the same students.
The one condition that changed was the question asked. By changing
the question, the teacher turned the predetermined discussion into a
democratic deliberation. By using a question that was open enough
to allow for an actual disagreement (but not so open that it got
difficult to come to a conclusion) and at the same time closed enough
to allow for striving toward consensus (but not so closed that it got
difficult to disagree on the matter), she steered the discussion in the
direction of a democratic deliberation.
This is, however, a highly contextual matter. A question
directing one classroom discussion toward a democratic deliberation does not have to do the same in another classroom or at another
time. Thus, finding a question with the right balance is up to the
person (teacher) leading the discussion and is dependent on a
number of contextual factors. It is important to emphasize, however,
that finding the right question is only one of many factors contributing to the construction of democratic deliberation in classrooms and
will not on its own turn every classroom discussion into a perfect
democratic deliberation. Furthermore, even if patterns of democratic deliberation appear, it does not guarantee that every student
participates, since there are many different reasons for why students
could be left out. Thus, there are numerous obstacles in constructing
deliberative democratic patterns of conversation in classrooms, and
even if one succeeds at that, getting everyone involved might still be
a challenge. The question of involving everyone is important in an
educational sense. It is also, however, a question relevant for
deliberative democracy in a wider sense. There may be contextual
and structural factors required for a deliberation to fully qualify as
democratic, as, for example, being at a certain level of equality,
inclusion, and nondiscrimination in general. These questions are
important and worthy of further discussion and investigation. In this
article, however, the focus has been narrower, and in that context,
finding a question with the right balance is arguably a crucial factor
for constructing democratic deliberations in classrooms.

Conclusion
There are different ways of theorizing deliberative democracy, but
scholars within the field agree upon the core of it: a reason-based
public deliberation focused on reaching a collective decision.
Therefore, an education for deliberative democracy is first and
foremost interested in teaching future citizens how to state
arguments, underpin them with reasons, listen to and reflect upon
what others are saying, while striving to reach a collective conclusion with the other participants. Based upon the pedagogical idea
that deliberative democratic skills are learned through participation in democratic deliberations, I have in this article attempted to
flesh out the abstract criteria of democratic deliberation. By
creating an empirically based typology, I have shown what a
democratic deliberation might look like inside a classroom, as well
as distinguished it from other closely related types of discussions.
Based upon this typology, I have also discussed possible
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implications for classroom practices. The conclusion is that by
posing a question that gives students the possibility to disagree on
the matter, while at the same time giving them the opportunity to
reach a collective conclusion, it is possible to steer classroom
discussions in the direction of democratic deliberation.
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